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Abstract: When the tales of the Icelandic and Irish crises are told, they are framed as if one 
country did everything right to exit recession. In this paper I assess their recovery policies and 
find that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. By allowing its banking system to suffer 
substantial losses, Iceland shielded its citizens from the costly debt overhand apparent in Ireland. 
Ireland’s commitment to open capital markets and price deflation has allowed trade flows to 
remain robust, and relative prices to realign to signal sustainable production plans to 
entrepreneurs. These lessons provide a roadmap for other countries entering similar crises in the 
future. 
 
                                                 
1
 This paper builds off and extends arguments made in Howden (2012). Research funding was generously provided 
by the Mercatus Center. I would like to thank Devin Bowen for excellent research assistance, and two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments. 
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1 Introduction 
In the fall of 2008, the Icelandic banking system collapsed, giving rise to a general economic 
recession and currency crisis. The size of the banking system and the severity of the events 
rendered both the Icelandic government and its central bank unable to save the insolvent 
financial system. The dire situation was mirrored 1,000 miles to the southeast, as Ireland entered 
into a similar banking crisis. Without a concerted effort to bail out its banking system, it would 
be brought to its knees like its Nordic neighbour’s. The sentiment of the time was captured in a 
common joke: 
 
“What’s the difference between Ireland and Iceland? Six months and one letter.” 
 
Today each country is slowly exiting its recession, though not without considerable hardship 
along the way. In general, output has recovered stronger in Ireland while employment growth is 
more robust in Iceland. In many ways each country pursued an opposite policy response to their 
recessions: whether it be concerning monetary policy, banking guarantees, nationalizations of the 
financial sector, or capital controls on the economy.2 In this article, I assess the distinct responses 
and separate the wheat from the chaff. Neither country was able to construct an optimal policy 
response, though pieces of each response have merit. I conclude with some lessons for countries 
in similar situations – small open economies with large financial sectors.  
 
2 Nationalizing the Financial Sector 
The comparison between Iceland’s and Ireland’s crisis responses typically centres on the idea 
                                                 
2
 The different responses stem, in part, from the different instigators of the crisis in each country (Howden 
forthcoming). In this paper I ignore the causes of each country’s crisis and focus exclusively on the policy responses 
that resulted.  
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that Ireland bailed out its banking sector, while Iceland allowed its to default. Although this is 
true in some ways, it understates the role of the Icelandic government in saving its own banks. 
 
2.1  The Liquidation of the Icelandic Financial Sector 
The size of the Icelandic banking system, and more importantly the extent of its foreign-
denominated liabilities, exceeded the ability of the government or the Central Bank of Iceland 
(CBI) to bail out. The big three Icelandic banks—Kaupthing, Glitnir, and Landsbanki—
dominated the Icelandic banking sector, holding almost 80 percent of its banking assets. More 
strikingly, these assets amounted to 1,100 percent of Icelandic GDP in 2007 (Buiter and Sibert 
2008). By comparison, the U.S. banking sector’s total assets in 2007 were less than the size of 
the whole economy and were spread over a much less concentrated banking industry. 
In the initial stages of the crisis of 2008 the Icelandic government did attempt to 
nationalize the financial system in an attempt to save it. Most notable was the September 29 
announcement that Glitnir, the third largest of its banks, was to become effectively nationalized 
via a €600 million purchase of its assets by the government. This, and subsequent attempts to 
nationalize the banks, failed to materialize and the country’s Financial Supervisory Authority 
(FME) took over the banks to place them into receivership. The scope of the debts incurred was 
beyond the ability of the government to secure, and their denomination in foreign currency made 
the CBI unable to guarantee them. By October 8, all three of the large Icelandic banks had been 
similarly placed into receivership. Not strictly bailing out the Icelandic banks and placing them 
into receivership allowed the sovereign of Iceland to remain solvent due to its unwillingness (and 
inability) to guarantee the banking sector’s debts. 
 Placing the banks into receivership has oftentimes been misconstrued as allowing them to 
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fail. In fact, the FME ring-fenced the domestic operations of these banks using a modification of 
the good bank–bad bank model employed in Sweden in 1992. Instead of just isolating toxic from 
clean assets, however, they opted to split the banks along geographic lines in an effort to protect 
Iceland from international default (Danielsson 2011a). Unfortunately few assets of suitable 
quality existed for either the good or the bad bank, effectively rendering the new, albeit smaller 
banks in trouble and the government on the hook for domestic deposit insurance payouts. “New” 
(nýi) banks were formed to provide for the continued banking operations of “Icelandic families 
and businesses” (Financial Supervisory Authority 2008a; b; c). Emergency legislation passed on 
October 7 by the Icelandic parliament gave depositors and the country’s deposit insurance plan 
priority over other claims to banks. Domestic assets and liabilities were transferred to the new 
banks. Deposits in foreign branches were given priority status to the assets held in the old banks. 
Bondholders of the banks—both new and old—were left with claims to the assets that remained 
in the old banks. In this way much of the banking debt was “repudiated,” though it is clear that 
depositors (especially domestic depositors) were given priority (Baldursson 2011).  
 The Icelandic government lent these three new banks €7.96 billion in a bid to recapitalize 
them, pushing the public debt to more than 70 percent of the country’s 2008 gross national 
income. This action placed Icelandic public finances on an unsustainable trajectory (Danielsson 
2011b) and created what some may call a “dysfunctional” banking system, more interested in 
recovering its assets from the old banks than in providing core banking activities (Danielsson 
2011a). While this has reduced the risk of a sovereign default by ensuring banks put solvency 
issues at the forefront, it has limited banks’ abilities to fund investment activities essential to 
growth. 
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2.2  The Nationalization of the Irish Financial Sector 
Faced with the real possibility of having its banking system collapse, in September 2008 the Irish 
Ministry of Finance guaranteed all senior bondholders and extended its deposit insurance 
guarantee to an unlimited amount. The latter policy had the beneficial effect of generating 
additional capital, which flowed from other troubled European countries to the perceived safety 
of the Irish banking system. It also created a contingent liability for the Irish government of 
about 200 percent of GDP (Connor et al. 2010: 5). Political tensions grew because Ireland’s 
European neighbours were unhappy about its unilateral guarantee, which pushed them to follow 
suit with their own deposit guarantees in an attempt to stifle deposit outflows. 
 By December of that year, the Irish government had spent €5.5 billion to take controlling 
stakes in the country’s three main banks—Allied Irish Bank (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BoI), and 
Anglo Irish Bank. In an emergency legislative session, Anglo Irish Bank was nationalized in 
January 2009, with AIB and BoI each receiving €3.5 billion recapitalizations. 
 Although these costs of nationalizing Ireland’s three main banks seem fairly 
insignificant—barely €3,000 per Irish citizen—a more extensive if controversial measure was the 
government’s purchase of their bad assets. The National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) 
was created in late 2009 to take on nonperforming property development loans in exchange for 
government bonds. While this measure was undertaken to stabilize the banking system, it also 
ultimately raised the taxpayer cost of resolving the banking crisis (Honohan 2010; Lane 2011).  
 NAMA purchased loans estimated to be worth €72 billion for €30 billion, making 
payment partly in cash, and partly by issuing government bonds. This amounted to nearly €7,000 
in additional public debt per Irish citizen. It was soon apparent that the Irish government could 
not afford to finance a deficit during the crisis and support NAMA simultaneously, and Irish 
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bond prices began deteriorating. By November 2010, the Irish government was obliged by the 
EU and the IMF to accept an €85 billion bailout, with another €150 billion being provided by the 
ECB to meet the liquidity needs of the banking system through secondary market bond 
purchases. Including this additional ECB liquidity directed to the banking sector, the Irish 
government increased its indebtedness by nearly €25,000 per citizen. These bank bailouts alone 
amounted to over 14 percent of Ireland’s GDP in 2009, and 32 percent of GDP in 2010 (Kinsella 
and Lyons 2011). Despite these efforts, by April 2011 all six of the major Irish banks had been 
reduced to junk bond status. By the time the nationalizations were complete the total cost of the 
bank bailout was 50 to 60 percent of 2010 GDP (O’Callaghan 2011). 
 
2.3 Discretionary Costs of the Bailouts? 
As a consequence of this one-time payment to the banking system, Iceland’s public deficit has 
not swelled today due to payments to sustain its banking sector—the cost has already been 
incurred. In Ireland this is decidedly not the case. Additional public sector payments to sustain its 
zombie banking system—one which is insolvent but sustained by government transfers—have 
become the norm. Iceland continues to run a public deficit, but not to sustain its banking sector. 
Instead, strained public finances are the result of decreases in tax revenue from the crisis coupled 
with an increased drain on its services due to plush unemployment insurance payments and other 
transfer schemes. Indeed, in 2009 government transfers to households increased to 8.2 percent of 
GDP, up from 6.1 percent the previous year. Likewise, “public social protection expenditures” 
increased to 11.3 percent of GDP, up from 8.9 percent in 2009 (Ólafsson 2011: 12). While it 
could get its deficit under control today by cutting other discretionary spending, Ireland cannot 
do the same until it allows its banking sector to fail because continual transfers have become 
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necessary to its continued functioning. Indeed, as illustrated in table 1, Iceland has largely 
reigned in its public deficit while Ireland still grapples with double digit expansions to its public 
debt level.  
 
Iceland Ireland 
  Public Debt  Deficit/Surplus   Public Debt Deficit/Surplus 
2005 26.0 4.9 27.3 1.7 
2006 27.9 6.3 24.6 2.9 
2007 28.5 5.4 25.1 0.1 
2008 70.4 −13.5 44.5 −7.4 
2009 87.9 −10.0 64.8 −13.9 
2010 93.0 −10.1   92.1 −30.8 
2011 101.0 −5.4 106.4 −13.4 
2012 n.a. n.a. 117.6 -7.6 
Table 1: Public debt and deficits (percent of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The current unsustainable path of Iceland’s public finances is only possible through the $2.1 
billion IMF-supported program enacted in 2008. The ability of the government to continue 
running large deficits has allowed the country to set itself on a path that must be corrected before 
insolvency fears re-emerge. 
 
3 Internal or External Depreciations? 
Perhaps the greatest distinction in the aftermaths of the two countries’ crises is found in their 
exchange rate regimes. With its independent currency, Iceland’s króna depreciated quickly as 
banks sold off domestic assets to fund foreign liabilities. Ireland succumbed to an exchange rate 
determined in large part by the eurozone’s economic strength, as well as by policies enacted in 
Frankfurt by the ECB with little regard for the country’s fundamentals (Sharkah and Pawela 
8 
 
2010). 
 
3.1 Was Iceland’s Ability to Depreciate Beneficial? 
In response to increased foreign claims on Icelandic banks, the sale of domestic assets 
depreciated the króna. Throughout 2008 the currency lost about half of its value against both the 
U.S. dollar and the euro. While this sharp depreciation hampered banks as they attempted to 
meet their foreign claims, it did have the beneficial effect of allowing export-oriented industries 
to regain international competitiveness quickly. A trade deficit of 30 percent of GDP at the end of 
2006 began to reverse in response to increased affordability of domestically sourced Icelandic 
goods. Entrepreneurs eager to put their newly competitively priced currency to good use came up 
with creative solutions to profit from the collapse. HEKLA, a 74-year-old car importer in 
Iceland, constructed a database to clear the excess supply of cars. Buyers from the Faroe Islands, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Germany rushed to purchase these cars, and allowed the island 
to become an exporter of automobiles for the first time in its history (Bagus and Howden 2011a: 
107). The fact that Iceland is much more open than other economies made it especially important 
to seek recovery through its trade account. The openness index – the ratio of total exports and 
imports to GDP – is a common way to proxy an economy’s degree of openness. In 2009 this 
index stood at 48.6 percent for Iceland, versus 41.3 for the broader OECD and 29.1 for the 
United Kingdom. 
 This króna depreciation has benefited Iceland, but only with a lag. The reason is not in 
the effectiveness of the depreciation to stimulate exports, but rather in the lack of domestic 
productive capacity to produce goods to export (Bagus and Howden 2011a: 112). In one sense, 
by saving the defunct banks in the form of their new versions with government money, parts of 
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an unsustainable banking model have been sustained artificially, and resources have not been 
redirected to sustainable paths. The fishing industry, for example, can export to help the island in 
its recovery, but its output has been slow to respond to its price advantage due to a relative lack 
of labour. This is partly because it is time-consuming for workers to learn skills for a new job. 
Given that the seafood industry directly and indirectly accounts for 26 percent of Iceland’s GDP, 
and up to 8 percent of its labor force (Sigfusson and Arnason 2011), inhibiting this key sector 
from growing will prolong the crisis.  
Icelandic inflation totalled approximately 28 percent from 2008-09, as the CBI moved to 
paper over banking and deposit insurance losses (table 3). Iceland’s ability to inflate some of its 
debt away solved one apparent problem but may exacerbate a larger one. The swift depreciation 
allowed the CBI to honour some of its pledges made to domestic residents though it did nothing 
to help those who had their debts denominated in a foreign currency, nor did it aid exporters as 
much as might at first blush be assumed. As the financial sector had some of its debts inflated 
away, losses were not as great as would otherwise have been the case. While this had the 
immediate effect of softening the blow, it hindered the exit of workers from this area to more 
sustainable sectors. As a result, export sectors that can generate capital through exports—such as 
the seafood industry—have been unable to expand as quickly as would otherwise be the case. 
Some relevant prices in the country have fallen over the past four years. In particular, 
securities’ prices have collapsed as the general Icelandic stock index fell 93 percent, and housing 
prices have fallen throughout the country. These price declines, though painful in a financial 
sense, have sent entrepreneurs a necessary signal as to relative costs and profits in the economy 
in an attempt to attract their attention to the necessary restructuring. Instead of relying on 
financial profits from investment portfolios, Icelanders have worked to generate real income-
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generating businesses. The fall in stock prices has also increased the cost of capital, which, 
although making some business ventures unprofitable, allows this unprofitability to be easily 
seen. When equity prices soared during the boom, the cost of capital in Iceland fell below what 
was necessary given the supply of real savings to sustain investment projects. As prices have 
fallen, international competitiveness has been regained, and signalled to investors in the form of 
higher profits.  
 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Euro area 6.6 4.5 4.3 −2.3 −0.6 1.2 3.4 
Germany −1.2 −3.8 3.6 −1.2 1.4 1.4 2.1 
Iceland 16.8 9.4 6.2 −9.7 −3.0 4.6 5.9 
Ireland 14.2 1.7 −12.4 −18.6 −10.5 −16.7 4.3 
USA 11.5 −2.0 −13.8 −18.9 2.3 −4.8 1.6 
Table 2: House Prices (percent change, year-on-year) 
Source: Eurostat experimental house price index, S&P/Case-Shiller national index, Statistics 
Iceland, Ireland Central Statistics Office 
 
 
3.2  The Euro as Ireland’s Quasi Gold Standard 
By being locked into the eurozone, Ireland sacrificed one important policy tool. Lacking an 
independent central bank, the country could not inflate its obligations away. This has come to be 
seen as a major detriment to Ireland as it tries to regain its footing, though there are important 
caveats to remember. 
 First, in a bid to regain international competitiveness the relevant price is the real 
exchange rate. Decreasing the cost for others to import your goods is a function of your domestic 
selling price and the nominal exchange rate. The Irish price level declined for two consecutive 
years, and the country has experienced deflation relative to its continental European neighbours, 
as can be seen in table 3. As a consequence, despite having the same nominal exchange rate as 
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other eurozone members, Ireland has been able to regain relative competitiveness through a 
depreciating real exchange rate.  
 
  
Iceland Ireland Eurozone 
2005 1.4 2.2 2.2 
2006 4.6 2.7 2.2 
2007 3.6 2.9 2.1 
2008 12.8 3.1 3.3 
2009 16.3 −1.7 0.3 
2010 7.5 −1.6 1.6 
2011 4.2 1.2 2.7 
2012 5.1 1.7 2.2 
Total 
change 69.7% 10.1% 17.8% 
Table 3: Irish, Icelandic and eurozone inflation 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Second, one problem in the boom was not one of all prices inflating to the same degree. As credit 
was injected into the economy asymmetric affects resulted, sending erroneous price signals to 
investors. As an example, cheap credit engendered a housing boom, leading property prices to 
rise faster than other prices. As a consequence, many Irish resources were directed to the real 
estate market, at the expense of other productive activities. At the peak of the boom, 13 percent 
of Irish employment was in the construction industry, and it produced 24 percent of the Irish 
gross national product, as opposed to an average of 12 percent for the rest of Western Europe 
(Kinsella 2012). The false price signals sent to entrepreneurs needed to be corrected: housing 
prices needed to fall relative to other prices. Depreciation in the nominal exchange rate would 
have resulted in an equivalent decline in all prices. What is necessary at some point in time is an 
alteration of the constellation of prices. 
 In Ireland domestic disinflation and more recently deflation have guided prices back to 
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their correct relative levels, allowing entrepreneurs to regain focus on the profitable areas of the 
economy. While Ireland’s other peripheral European counterparts—Greece, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain—have had more trouble reaching the bottom of their busts, the common reason provided 
is that they cannot regain competitiveness with the currently strong euro. This neglects the 
importance of domestic price deflation (or at least disinflation) and begs the question why this 
has not occurred. One significant reason can be found in the relative size of each country’s public 
sector, as shown in table 4. Despite running large public deficits, Ireland’s public sector is 
smaller than that of most of its peripheral eurozone counterparts, with the second lowest tax 
burden. Even when factoring the large ongoing cost of bailing out the Irish banking sector, Irish 
public expenditure is still not higher than the majority of its counterparts, and remains below that 
of the larger eurozone. 
 
  
Total government 
revenue 
Total government 
expenditure 
Italy 46.1 49.9 
Eurozone 45.3 49.4 
Portugal 44.7 48.9 
Iceland 41.7 46.1 
Greece 40.9 50.1 
Ireland 35.3 48.1 
Spain 35.1 43.6 
Table 4: Government size (2011, percent of GDP) 
Source: The Heritage Foundation 
 
The public sector typically experiences more rigid labor costs than its private alternatives (Hutt 
1977, Bagus and Howden 2011b: 392-93). Public unions, especially in Europe’s south, enjoy 
engrained positions due to their numbers and potential to sway politics. In addition, fewer Irish 
firms are subject to union agreements obstructing wage declines than the eurozone average. (72 
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percent of Irish firms are subject to union agreements, accounting for 42 percent of all employees 
while the eurozone figures are 94 and 84 percent (Du Caju et al. 2013: 12).) Furthermore, only 
39 percent of surveyed Irish firms cite regulations or union agreements as a reason to avoid wage 
cuts versus 85 percent of eurozone firms (ibid.: 17). Austerity measures aimed at reducing public 
sector expenditures were implemented in Ireland with minimal public sector backlash. As a 
consequence, important prices such as wages fell more quickly in Ireland than in other European 
countries, allowing it to regain competitiveness while remaining in the eurozone. 
 Third, while a currency depreciation will aid exporters to some degree, it has two 
significant drawbacks. The first of these is that an expansion of the money supply is necessary to 
depreciate a currency, and such a policy places upward pressure on prices (as was the case in 
Iceland). The result is potentially nil, as the two effects may counter each other. The second 
drawback is a consequence of the first—any depreciation of the currency aids one group while 
harming another. In this case, exporters may be aided, while domestic consumers and producers 
will see their costs increase, and their real savings dwindle, so that a decline in savings through 
an inflationary policy will hinder recovery. 
 The preceding discussion is not to imply that price deflation has been costless or easy in 
Ireland. It is rather a question of when the costs will be incurred. Although prices were quick to 
adjust downwards, there was a short-run decrease in output until this happened. While this could 
have been somewhat mitigated by an inflationary policy, as in Iceland, it would have prohibited 
important relative price adjustments from taking place. Deflation has allowed relative prices to 
realign themselves in a bid to better signal to entrepreneurs those avenues of investment more 
conducive to growth. Thus, even though Ireland was locked into a currency union and unable to 
unilaterally allow its currency to adjust to regain competitiveness, it was able to make the 
14 
 
necessary price adjustments domestically. 
 Not only do these adjusting prices allow entrepreneurs to better see what avenues of 
investment are more valued, they also allow important costs to readjust. The decline in housing 
prices has reverberated backward to adjust downward input costs, including labour costs for 
construction workers. While declining incomes for these workers may seem like a negative 
result, it allows workers to realize where they are most valued and readjust their employment 
accordingly. In many ways we can sympathize with Huerta de Soto (2012) as he refers to the 
euro positively as a type of quasi “gold standard.” By not being able to inflate its problems away, 
Ireland along with other periphery eurozone countries are facing the reality that their fiscal paths 
are unsustainable and that prices, including wages, will need to adjust accordingly. These price 
adjustments permit the relative price structure to realign to signal entrepreneurs and investors 
what production and investment plans are sustainable.  
 
4 Two Types of IMF Bailouts 
Though both countries eventually succumbed to IMF-led bailouts, important differences in their 
implementations abound. Ireland’s bailout by the ECB and IMF came with some high costs, 
although capital controls aimed at inhibiting the outflow of funds were absent. As a result, trade 
flows continued largely as usual, with exports increasing due to its increased competitiveness 
through price deflation. 
 
4.1 Icelandic Capital Controls 
Iceland became the first developed country in over 30 years to request aid from the IMF 
(Gylfason 2011). When accepting emergency loans, the IMF imposed strict capital controls as 
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part of the package (International Monetary Fund 2010; Yeyati 2011). The aim of the controls 
was to: 1) limit foreign currency outflows, 2) stop the exchange rate from depreciating further, 
and, 3) keep foreign exchange available for vital transactions. While the controls were originally 
temporary in nature, they persist to this day with no plans to taper them off until 2015 at the 
earliest. 
These controls resulted in some unintended consequences, and in many ways differed 
from the conventional or more modern use of capital controls. In particular, as part of the IMF’s 
standby agreement of November 2008, residents and non-residents were obliged to report all 
foreign exchange transactions to the Central Bank of Iceland. Residents were forced to surrender 
all foreign exchange to the central bank within two weeks of obtaining it by depositing the 
proceeds in a domestic bank. Divestments of foreign direct investments in Iceland were not 
permitted. Finally, only financial products denominated in króna were allowed under the 
controls. 
 Some have called a return to such harsh capital controls draconian, and their use marks a 
strict departure from how the IMF has more recently implemented emergency relief (Arnason 
and Danielsson 2011). While capital controls are increasingly seen as a way to prevent excess 
foreign investment from overheating an economy, these controls have marked a shift backward 
to controlling all transactions, even those that are potentially beneficial. By placing blanket 
controls over the whole economy, currency flows that would have been beneficial (e.g., 
purchasing imports necessary for the sustainability of a small, isolated island) have been placed 
in the same category as those deemed troublesome (e.g., carry traders liquidating króna holdings 
and depreciating the currency further). 
 These controls have inhibited the Icelandic recovery by removing several options from 
16 
 
citizens trying to recover lost economic activity. Entrepreneurs must seek permission from the 
CBI to procure foreign funds to invest abroad. Emigration from the country is limited, as 
individuals have no guarantee that they can take their financial capital with them. Domestically 
the controls could also be depreciating the króna, thus harming sectors reliant on imports (such 
as the food industry). Since Icelandic exporters have limited confidence in their future ability to 
access their earnings, they do not bring home all their foreign earnings. This has the effect of 
keeping the currency weaker than would otherwise be the case (Gylfason 2011). 
 Unable to easily get króna out of the country, foreign investors find themselves with 
limited options for any currency held in Iceland. Much of it is today being funnelled into real 
estate—thus propagating a new bubble in the housing sector (Valdimarsson 2012). International 
investors wary of channelling their savings into the current outlets, and lacking investment 
opportunities in avenues they deem sustainable, are at a loss for options. Thus investing in a real 
asset like real estate, even if it creates a new bubble, is less risky than remaining invested in 
Icelandic financial assets that might lose value if the recession renews itself.  
 More detrimental, perhaps, is the fact that the controls reduce foreign trust in the 
economy. By blocking divestments on projects funded by incoming foreign direct investment 
(FDI), the CBI has created a clear disincentive for foreigners to invest in Iceland. Coupled with 
this is the fact that Iceland has the highest number of restrictions on foreign direct investment of 
all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(Kalinova et al. 2010), contributing to a collapse in domestic investment.3  
 Arnason and Danielsson (2011) estimate the deadweight loss of the capital controls to be 
1 percent of Icelandic GDP per year. Such a drain on a crisis-stricken economy is large, and 
                                                 
3
 Icelandic investment had declined to 10 percent of GDP by 2010, compared to a decline to only 17 percent in the 
EU (Danielsson 2011b). 
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delays full recovery. Additionally, the controls delay one important price adjustment from 
occurring. Although a depreciation of the króna by itself is not a panacea for the economy—
relative price adjustments must also occur—it is true that the króna was artificially overvalued 
leading up to the crisis, mostly due to ample government guarantees on the banking sector 
(Howden forthcoming). (The Economist’s Big Max Index ranked the króna as the most over-
valued currency in the world on 1 February 2007.) The capital controls have the effect of 
partially propping up the currency, making this currency adjustment more difficult to obtain. It is 
also difficult to ascertain whether the controls have any meaningful effect today. The exchange 
rate has already fallen by more than half over the past four years. Much capital had already left 
the country before the controls were established, and there may be little incentive for divestments 
to occur now. In fact, given the partially recovered state of the Icelandic economy, it is more 
likely that the controls are inhibiting capital inflows by removing an exit option from 
investments than keeping existing investments within the country.  
 
4.2 Ireland’s Maintained Trade and Financial Flows 
Despite also being the recipient of funding through the IMF, Ireland was not subject to capital 
controls. The reasons are twofold. First, since Ireland is a part of the eurozone, there is no 
possibility of managing its exchange rate by such a policy. Second, barriers to trade would have 
conflicted with existing EU treaties. Consequently, the country has not been impaired by such 
policies, and capital flows have aided Ireland’s return to normalcy—unlike that of its northern 
neighbour. 
 The distinction in the treatment of two countries making use of an IMF emergency loan is 
stark. Ireland was spared the curtailment of FDI in light of the fact that capital could still flow 
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freely into, and more importantly out of, the country. Investors could make liberal use of the 
country’s unemployed citizens and lower wages without fear that they would not be able to exit 
with their funds if the project failed to meet their expectations. 
 The results are evident in Ireland’s trade balance. Net exports have increased from less 
than 10 percent of GDP to almost 20 percent since the crisis began. While domestic demand for 
Irish goods has been falling, foreigners willing to take advantage of its newfound 
competitiveness have taken up the slack, and exports now lead the recovery. Foreign direct 
investment has also remained strong, reaching 11.9 and 8.6 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, 
higher than it has been for over a decade. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This comparison has shed light on several key differences between Iceland’s and Ireland’s 
policies in the wake of their financial collapses. In implementing policies to ease the effects of 
these two crises, three aspects stand out.  
The first is the role of the countries’ currencies in returning them to competitiveness. 
Ireland was unable to depreciate its currency, but the domestic price level was able to fall, thus 
compensating by depreciating the real value of its euro and lowering export costs. In Iceland the 
quick depreciation of the króna served to give the country a quick cost-based advantage. These 
across-the-board cost decreases from the depreciation did little to rectify the price 
maladjustments that the boom bred. In this way, Ireland suffered in the short run through an 
output decline, but by allowing the array of relative prices to adjust Irish entrepreneurs are now 
able to see the areas of the economy most conducive to growth.  
 Second, Ireland’s use of the euro protected it from some worse fates. In particular it made 
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the country immune to calls for capital controls. When Iceland received its standby agreement 
from the IMF as part of its 2008 aid package, it included controls aimed at reducing the outflow 
of foreign reserves. This had the unintended consequence of also limiting the amount of 
incoming foreign investment that foreign investors were willing to risk in Iceland. Ireland enjoys 
a high degree of foreign investment today, as creditors are not worried about accessing their 
funds in the future. No such assurance can be offered in Iceland, and the capital controls are now 
slated to stay in effect until 2015. 
 Third, the nationalization of the financial sector in Ireland has left taxpayers on the hook 
for billions of euros. By allowing a large part of its financial sector to fail, Icelandic authorities 
have saved its taxpayers from funding a risky project. This has made funds available for social 
programs that have aided the unemployed throughout the crisis. Furthermore, allowing an 
insolvent banking sector to fail has allowed resources to be redirected, unlike in Ireland. 
 Iceland and Ireland provide two case studies for challenges facing an economy facing a 
modern banking crisis. Other countries, notably the United States and United Kingdom, have 
banking situations that feature similar weaknesses, including 1) poorly collateralized loans, 2) a 
reliance on continued credit expansion to roll over short-term funding, and 3) heavy exposure to 
the real estate market. There are three lessons to take from these two countries. 
First, any losses in the banking sector are only the previous mistakes and malinvestments 
made visible. Covering up losses via bank bailouts does little to fix mistakes that were made in 
the past, and may delay recovery moving forward. The collapse of the banking system only 
exposed an insolvent system for what it was. The Icelandic approach of allowing unambiguously 
insolvent institutions to default allows losses to be realized sooner, and a strong foundation for 
recovery to be built upon. 
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Second, currency depreciation allows some types of adjustments to be made, but others 
can only be achieved by domestic price adjustments. In Ireland this happened quickly, allowing 
entrepreneurs to receive signals concerning how to reallocate resources to escape the recession. 
Iceland’s swift depreciation increased the country’s international competitiveness, but may now 
inhibit relative prices from realigning quickly to sustain the recovery. Iceland’s approach 
inhibited the constellation of relative prices from quickly realigning in a sustainable manner and 
will jeopardize future growth, something that Ireland is increasingly well-positioned to take 
advantage of. By not inflating its problem away and thus allowing for price deflation, Ireland has 
realigned relative prices to a more sustainable array that allows entrepreneurs to see what areas 
of the economy are profitable. 
Finally, some policies aimed at controlling capital flows have detrimental results. In 
Iceland’s case, IMF-imposed capital controls have cost the country 1 percent of GDP for three 
years, and are estimated to stay in effect for at least another three years. While stopping the 
outflow of foreign reserves, the controls have also limited inflows. While the lack of capital 
controls in Ireland could have resulted in an outflow of capital, the evidence suggests that just 
the opposite happened. Taking advantage of lower costs and unused resources, capital has flowed 
into Ireland in recent years. The Icelandic approach has discouraged foreign entrepreneurs from 
investing domestically due to uncertainty about whether they will be able to access their capital 
in the future. In this way, Ireland’s continued commitment to open markets and trade has allowed 
foreign participation to shift the weight of recovery away from only domestic producers. 
When the tale of these two crises is told, the conclusion is typically that one set of 
policies was more beneficial than the other. In this paper I have shown that the truth lies 
somewhere in the middle. Icelanders have benefited by evading a debt overhang through an 
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undue bank bailout that shielded investors from losses. The Irish commitment to open capital 
markets and a willingness to reduce domestic prices to regain competitiveness has allowed prices 
to return to levels necessary for entrepreneurs to use as signals to invest. Countries facing similar 
crises—be they currency, banking, or generally economic—would be well-advised to heed these 
lessons when drafting recovery plans of their own. 
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